Richard Anthony Torres

12/18/1998

Philosophy 306

Final Paper

 

The following paper is my final assignment for my last Philosophy course, which completed my minor in the field of study. In this paper I attempted to analyze the existence of other minds beyond that of one's own mind, if such existence is logical. This paper was very different from the normal compositions I had to write for my English courses in style, voice, and in tone. With Philosophy, the focus is upon the information and the argument and not necessarily the topic or thesis, which helped me logically think out my statements and the placement of statements for the purpose of soundness and validity. I hope you enjoy this work. The only advice I have to offer before you enter this piece is, "go forth into the unknown with a strong mind, but with your new knowledge do not forget you have one."

 

Other Minds?

Bertrand Russell expressed his belief on knowing other minds, in an article based primarily around the notion of ‘analogy’, meaning similar to or likeness of. His belief is that, "We are convinced that other people have thoughts and feelings that are qualitatively fairly similar to our own. We are not content to think that we know only the space-time structure of our friends’ minds, or their capacity for initiating causal chains that end in sensations of our own" (Russell 89). Russell speaks of the inner awareness, such as being able to observe the occurrences of such things as remembering, feeling pleasure and feeling pain from within our own minds’. This would then allow us to presume that other beings that have these abilities would then be that of having minds.

The term ‘analogy’ is very vague in nature, but when used in this context, we assume that the behavior of other people is in many ways analogous in reference to causes. These causes being behavior directed from sensation or thought. It is apparent and observable that people or beings other then I behave in ways in which we behave when placed in different situations. For example sadness or the nature of anger or happiness can be seen in others. Others then can and do react to different causes similar to the way in which I do as well. Another consideration is that of shared experience. Russell uses the example of two friends having a conversation in which memoirs are explored. These two individuals have shared experiences together. They eventually discover that each other’s memories aid each other in recalling information forgotten with time. (Russell 89)

It can factually be said that beings in which can think, therefore have a mind, thus have causes for behavior. "As it is clear to me that the causal laws governing my behavior have to do with ‘thoughts’, it is natural to infer that the same is true of the analogous behavior of my friends" (Russell 89). Thus the aspect of inference is now the main concern when relating to analogy. Can we infer that other beings have thoughts and feelings to result such causes, as that in which is observable?

Russell explains this notion with the example of mother and her thoughts. "We find ourselves believing in them when we first begin to reflect; the thought that Mother may be angry or pleased is one which rises in early infancy" (Russell 90). What Russell is discussing is the possibility of a postulate, which establishes a rational connection between the belief that other beings having thoughts or feelings to that of data or result. For example, Russell says, "between the belief ‘Mother is angry’ and the hearing of a loud voice" (Russell 90).

The overall view thus allows us to formulate the following from observed knowledge; "We know, from observation of ourselves, a causal law of the form ‘A causes B,’ where A is a ‘thought’ and B a physical occurrence. We sometimes observe a B when we cannot observe any A; we then infer an unobserved A" (Russell 90). Therefore, if we observe a person playing full court basketball and then after the game states that he is thirsty, one would assume that he is thirsty since he not only made a statement about it, but also played in a full court basketball game. "We are supposed to know ‘A causes B,’ and also to know that B has occurred; if this is to justify us in inferring A, we must know that only A causes B. Or, if we are content to infer that A is probable, it will suffice if we can know that in most cases it is A that causes B" (Russell 90).

I realize from subjective observation that I understand that A or the thought, causes B or the bodily act. I know also that when I portray a B, that A is the cause of such B. I therefore observe that a B expressed from other then my body was initiated by which I could not observe. Yet I still believe that A can cause B, from my self-observation in relation to my mind. I therefore infer that there was an A that caused B, even though it is not that I can observe. From this I can gather that other people’s bodies are in relation with minds, which appear to resemble mine in reference to bodily behavior. (Russell 91)

However, Russell after making such an exact and certain statement challenged the notion of subjective observation. What if that in which we observe is not the result of our assumed A. In other words what if something else caused B other then A proposed. Even if the B we see has only one A within us, it does not mean we should accept A as the only cause for such as B. Thus Russell came forth with the following:

  • "If, whenever we can observe whether A and B are present or absent, we find that every case of B has an A as causal antecedents, then it is probable that most B’s have A’s as causal antecedents, even in cases where observation does not enable us to know whether A is present or not" (Russell 91).
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    • Russell thus presents us with an argument for other minds using analogy and that of subjective observation.

    However, Norman Malcolm does not share the same view point as that of Russell. "I believe that the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds still enjoys more credit than it deserves" (Malcolm 92). Malcolm presents his belief in other minds by presenting a statement by J.S. Mill that speaks upon that of the question pertaining to the existence of other minds consisting of sensations and thoughts.

  • "I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings. I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by a uniform sequence, of which the beginning is modifications of my body, the middle is feelings, and the end is outward demeanor. In the case of other human beings I have the evidence of my senses for the first and last links of the series, but not for the intermediate link. I find, however, that the sequence between the first and last is regular and constant in those other cases as it is in mine. I my own case I know that the first link produces that last through the intermediate link, and could not produce it without. Experience, therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in myself, or a different one: I must either believe them to be alive, that is, by supposing the link to be of the same nature as in the case of which I have experience, and which is in all other respects similar, I bring other human beings, as phenomena, under the same generalization which I know by experience to be the true theory of my own existence" (Malcolm 92).

    • Being that Mill has no criterion for the existence of feelings other then his own, we would have to say that, ‘It is probable that that human figure has feelings’ (Malcolm 92). Though we have no verification to understand others feelings, we can say we understand the response of ‘I have a pain’. When this statement is given, we associate that the person has a pain and we relate such a statement to our knowledge of having a pain. Therefore, a link is attempted to bring the statements, ‘I have a pain’ and ‘He has a pain’ to be that of the same. However, this thought is complicated with that of criterion once more as pointed out my Malcolm.

  • "If I do not know how to establish that ‘someone has a pain’ then I do not know how to establish that he has the same as I have when I have a pain. You cannot improve my understanding of ‘he has a pain’ by this recourse to the notion of ‘the same’, unless you give me a criterion for saying that someone has the same as I have" (Malcolm 93).
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    • Furthermore, Malcolm continues by saying that if you can discover a criterion then you have no use for the argument from analogy and if you cannot then you don’t understand the supposed conclusion of such. This he claims to be a philosophic dilemma, that in which a philosopher relies upon and cannot escape. (Malcolm 93)

    Malcolm thus presents the view of Mr. Stuart Hampshire in an attempt to repair the argument from analogy. Hampshire uses non-inferential knowledge from others about his feelings to check the inferences made about himself and within himself. "Presumably I can also note when the inferences of others about my feelings do not go wrong. Having ascertained the reliability of some inference-procedures I can use them myself, in a guarded way, to draw conclusions about the feelings of others, with a modest but justified confidence in the truth of those conclusions" (Malcolm 93). Malcolm thus response in reference to Hampshire’s statement, that the reasoning of Hampshire involves the assumption that other beings so have thoughts and sensations, because they are assumed to make inferences about the observed form observations of the observed behavior. However, the problem of the existence of other minds is the problem of whether or not beings other then myself, make observations, inferences or even assertions. (Malcolm 93)

    "Thus the reasoning becomes simply the classical argument from analogy: ‘when my behavior is such and such I feel giddy; so probably when another human figure behaves the same way he feels the same way.’ This argument, again, is caught in the dilemma about the criterion of the same" (Malcolm 93).

    With this we have another version of analogical reasoning offered by H.H. Price.

  • "He suggests that ‘one’s evidence for the existence of other minds is derived primarily from the understanding of language.’ His idea is that if another body gives forth noises one understands, like ‘there’s a bus,’ and if these noises give new information, this ‘provides some evidence that the foreign body which uttered the noises is animated by a mind like one’s own" (Malcolm 93).
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    • Price’s view is that if an object, not necessarily a being, makes noises that one can understand, then the object has evidence of a mind. This of course can be complicated if say a tree rustled and was able to express speech. However, if the tree could answer a question then the tree would be believed to have a mind considering it was able to offer new information and not just recite information. Price through introspection has come to a conclusion that language comes from that of spontaneous thought or thinking. Thus, if similar combinations of sound are expressed by someone other then the original then it can be said that that being or thing functions as I in that it spontaneously thinks. This is evident since the thinker knows what acts of thinking and perceiving are and how they are related to that of the mind. (Malcolm 94)

    However, Malcolm in response to this proposal asks, how is it that we know the being, which speaks, actually has thoughts or sensations? Price would answer with a response related to that of a verbal response from the being in question. Yet, Malcolm presents the situation of infants and young children who have not quite mastered the way of speech. He brings forth the idea of behavior in relation to words. His example is that of the following: "Try to suppose that he says the right words but looks at and reaches for the wrong things. Should we be tempted to say that he has mastered the use of those words? No, indeed. The disparity between words and behavior would make us say that he does not understand the words" (Malcolm 94). If by saying this we would have to assume that babies and young children do not have minds. Since they are unable to respond to speech and are unable to understand words. This brings into question if Price’s theory of language is relevant without that of empiricist perception. Would not the behavior or sense experience from the observation lead to that of having a mind? Especially when it comes to the example of the hearing impaired or mentally retarded. These beings though unable to speak obviously through observation can in fact think by their ability to learn another form of communication. That process being that of sign language or even writing.

    Malcolm presents another dilemma to the belief of analogy by questioning the reliability of one learning from one’s own case what thinking, feeling, and sensation truly are. Malcolm in response to Price states, "He believes that he notes something in himself and he calls ‘thinking’ or ‘fear’ or ‘pain,’ and then tries to infer the presence of the same in others. He should then deal with the question of what his criterion of the same in others is. This he cannot do because it is of the essence of his viewpoint to reject circumstances and behavior as a criterion of mental phenomena in others" (Malcolm 95). Malcolm therefore, presents that the notion of thinking in others is ultimately meaningless, because Price does not know that which would count towards it or even against such. "That there should be thinking or pain other than my own is unintelligible" (Malcolm 95). "When I say ‘I am in pain,’ by ‘pain’ I mean a certain inward state. When I say ‘He is in pain,’ by ‘pain’ I mean behavior. I cannot attribute it to myself" (Malcolm 95).

    Wittgenstein has shown that the starting point in itself is destroyed from within. He brings to the surface that one supposes that one inwardly can identify something as thinking or pain and therefore identifies it when it presents itself in the soul. However, is it correct to say that one makes correct identifications when it comes to there own sense of A. If A causes B, then how does one know what A truly is, and for that matter can one accurately decipher A behind an observed B. The answer would be that of no. "Indeed he has no idea of what being right could mean" (Malcolm 95). "He does not know how to distinguish between actually making correct identifications and being under the impression that he does" (Malcolm 95). There appears to be no example to measure against for ourselves or for others being observed for B. "We do not know what a mistake would be. We have no standard, no examples, no customary practice, with which to compare our inner recognitions. The inward identification cannot hit the bull’s-eye, or miss it either, because there is no bull’s-eye" (Malcolm 95). Therefore, the ideas of correct and incorrect have no application to the supposed inner identification, the latter loses its sense in appearance. This collapse sends the argument of analogy into total destruction.

    A philosopher finds himself in a difficult situation due to the fact that he assumes that he is knowledgeable of the mental phenomena of ‘from one’s own case’. The philosopher would be able to make the transition of ‘one’s own case’ to ‘the case of others’, if thinking is freed from the illusion that one knows one’s mind or one’s own case. By the act of emancipation the philosopher is able to see the facts and acknowledge that the circumstances, behavior and spoken sounds of others are the criteria for that of the existence of mental states. (Malcolm 95)

    "The perplexity about the existence of other minds has, as the result of criticism, turned into a perplexity about the meaning of one’s own psychological sentences about oneself" (Malcolm 96). Behaviorist believe that self-observation would be relevant in this situation, however, the ‘one’s own case’ philosophy states that self-observation cannot be checked by others. With this we can conclude that the first person psychological statements can’t be verified by self-observation. "It follows that they have no verification at all; for if they had a verification it would have to be by self-observation" (Malcolm 96). In regards to this problem of perception of first person psychological sentences, Wittgenstein offers a suggestion. "First person sentences are to be thought of as similar to the natural non-verbal, behavioral expressions of psychological states" (Malcolm 96). For example, the statement ‘my leg hurts,’ should be related to crying or limping.

  • "I think this analogy ought to be explored. For it has two important merits: first, it breaks the hold on us of the question ‘How does one know when to say my leg hurts?’ for in the light of analogy this will be as nonsensical as the question ‘How does one know when to cry, limp, or hold one’s leg?" (Malcolm 96). "Second, it explains how the utterance of a first person psychological sentence by another person can have importance for us, although not as an identification—for in the light of the analogy it will have the same importance as the natural behavior which serves as our pre-verbal criterion of the psychological states of other" (Malcolm 96).

    • It appears evident that the question concerning other minds is one of many complications. To approach the problem with the belief in that A causes B, we find a problematic situation in which involves measurement. If we have no concrete knowledge of what A is within us then how are we to assume that observable B in an outward or inner case is able to be held true. However, if self-observation is inaccurate, then the aspect of language and behavior seem irrelevant to the actual question of ‘how do we know if our inclinations toward thoughts and sensations are correct or even possible to know?’

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    Works Cited

    Malcolm, Norman. "Knowledge of Other Minds". The Nature of Mind. Ed. David M.

    Rosenthal. New York: Oxford, 1991. 92-98.

    Russell, Bertrand. "Analogy". The Nature of Mind. Ed. David M. Rosenthal. New

    York: Oxford, 1991. 89-92.